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COMPROMISE OF CLAIMS BASED UPON PERSONAL INJURIES
TO MINORS.-A, aged twelve years, the son of B and C,
is struck by an automobile driven by D, sustaining per-
sonal injuries which result in the amputation of one of
his legs. B, the father, necessarily incurs expenses amount-
ing to $500.00 in having A's injuries properly treated. The
accident is alleged to have been caused by D's negligent
driving. D is willing to pay a substantial sum in settle-
ment of the claims growing out of the accident in order
to avoid litigation, and desires the preparation and execu-
tion of proper releases so that he may be fully protected
from the prosecution of any claims thereafter. In what
way can a valid and binding settlement of the claims be
effected, so as to afford complete protection to D? Situa-
tions and questions of this character are confronting prac-
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ticing lawyers everywhere with increasing frequency,
especially since the advent of the automobile. The propo-
sitions of law raised are of considerable practical impor-
tance, irrespective of what may be said as to their theoreti-
cal interest.
The first step, of course, is to ascertain precisely what
legal claims against D may have grown out of the accident.
Upon analysis, it will be found that, in the case supposed,
the injury to A created two separate causes of action
against D, namely:-
(1) The right of B, the father, to recover the amount of
the expenses incurred by him, and also for the loss of A's
services during minority. At common law, of course, the
father alone was entitled to his child's services and earn-
ings. In some states, however, of which West Virginia is
one' statutes have been enacted providing that the mother
shall have an equal right with the father to the services
and earnings of their children. In such jurisdiction, there-
fore, there would be two separate causes of action for loss
of services in the supposed case-one being vested in B
and the other in C.
(2) The right of A to be compensated for his pain and
suffering, and his permanent disability.
The settlement and release of the claims of the two
parents is, of course, without theoretical difficulty. B and
C are both sui juris, and therefore capable of entering into
binding contracts and releases. It is to be observed, how-
ever, that in jurisdictions like West Virginia where the
mother is entitled to a portion of her child's services and
earnings, both parents must join in the settlement and exe-
cute proper releases; if settlement should be made with
the father alone, the mother's cause of action would still be
alive.
The second cause of action mentioned above-that of A,
the minor-is not so easily disposed of. How can D with
safety secure a settlement and release of A's claim? It is
clear that a release signed by A himself would afford no
protection, as A could disaffirm the release when he
became of age and could then institute a suit against D
notwithstanding his signature to the instrument. Further-
' See WEST VMIINIA CODR, Ch. 82, 1.
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more, A would be under no obligation whatsoever to return
to D the money which A had been paid for signing the
release, unless it should happen that this money was still
intact in A's hands. Such was the doctrine pronounced by
our own Supreme Court of Appeals2 following the general
rule established in other jurisdictions.
It is equally apparent that B and C, merely in their
capacity as parents, have no power or authority to execute
a release discharging A's cause of action. A release from
the parents would be effective only so far as it discharged
their own claims for expenses and loss of services, referred
to above. An interesting case upon this question was one
where a child was bitten by a dog.3 The owner of the dog
endeavored to effect a settlement for the unfortunate acci-
dent by procuring a release signed by the parents only.
Later, the child died as a result of its injuries and its ad-
ministrator instituted suit under a Kentucky statute for
the purpose of recovering damages for the child's pain and
suffering from the time it received the injury until its death.
The Court of Appeals of Kentucky permitted a recovery,
holdifig that the release of the parents could not affect the
child's cause of action.
Two further methods of effecting a valid settlement of
A's claims may be suggested: (1) A settlement through
the form of court procedure generally known as a "friendly
suit", and (2) taking a release from the fiduciary in charge
of A's estate, commonly known as "legal guardian". These
two methods will, for the sake of clearness, be discussed
separately below.
The fundamental idea behind the "friendly suit" as a
means of perfecting a settlement for personal injuries to
minors is that in this way the transaction receives the stamp
of the court's approval. In the case supposed, the proce-
dure would probably be substantially as follows: After the
amount to be paid by D had been agreed upon, D's counsel
would engage some friendly attorney to institute a suit on
behalf of A against D. The usual declaration and pleas in
personal injury cases would be filed and the action regu-
larly matured and placed on the trial docket. Instead of
having a jury trial, however, judgment would be entered
Britton v. South Penn. Oil Co., 78 W. Va. 792, 81 S. E. 525 (1914).
M Neyer's Administrator v. ZaU, 119 Ky. 480, 84 S. W. 548 (1905).
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by the court in favor of A for the amount agreed upon,
either upon a verdict directed by the court or in the form
of a consent judgment, without any verdict at all. It will
thus be observed that, in actual practice, the friendly suit
usually fails of its fundamental purpose. The hearing of
the evidence and the court's approval of the amount of
settlement are perfunctory in most cases. It would seem
that the employment of a friendly suit in the supposed case
would be unsatisfactory to D for several reasons: It involves
considerable expense; it requires several months for com-
pletion; it subjects D to the danger oT having a much
larger verdict and judgment entered against him than he
had agreed to pay, in the event the evidence should actu-
ally be heard at length and the court and jury should
refuse to adhere to the agreed settlement; and on the other
hand, if the hearing of the evidence and entry of judgment
are merely perfunctory, as is usually the case, A will not
be bound thereby after he becomes of age. The cases
generally show how lightly the courts look upon a judg-
ment rendered in a friendly suit, when there is any showing
either that fraud was used in obtaining the judgment, or
that the amount of the agreed judgment was so small as
to be grossly unfair to the child. 4 The force which it would
give to a judgment of this character has apparently never
been squarely decided by the Supreme Court of Appeals
of West Virginia, but in a somewhat analogous situation,u
our Appellate Court indicated that it would not give much
force to a consent judgment or decree affecting the rights
of an infant, when the merits of the case had not been fully
considered by the trial court.
The writer conceives, that the method of perfecting a
settlement through the agency of a friendly suit may be
unsatisfactory, not only to the interested parties, but to the
court and the public as well. The time and energy of the
court and jury should be directed toward the determina-
tion of issues upon which parties cannot agree between
themselves. The procedure in a common law court is not
1 Leslie v. Proctor & Gamble Co., 102 Kan. 159. 169 Pac. 193, L. I. A. 19180, 55
(1917) ; Missouri Pacific Railroad Co... Lasca, 79 Kan. 318, 99 Pac. 616, 21 L. R. A.
(N. S.) 888 (1909) ; Cazroll v. Atlantic Steel Co., 151 Ga. 878, 106 S. E. 908, 15 A. L.
R. 660 (1921) ; Tennessee Coal Co. v. Hayes, 97 Ala. 201, 12 S. E. 98 (1890) ; Pittsburgh,
etc., Railroad Co. v. Haley, 170 Ill. 610, 48 N. E. 920 (1897); Rector v. Laurel River
Logging Co.. 179 N. C. 59, 101 S. E. 502 (1919); Robinson v. Floeach Construction Co.,
291 Mo. 34, 286 S. W. 882, 20 A. L. R. 1289 (1921).
* Simmons v. Simmons, 85 .W.,Va. 25, 100 8. E. 748 (1919).
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designed for the protection of the welfare of infants. If
an attempt should be made at the present time to settle all
personal injury claims of infants in this way, our courts
would soon have more cases of this character on their
dockets than they could conveniently take care of. That
this method of effecting a settlement is cumbersome and
unsatisfactory seems to be generally recognized by the
legal profession in West Virginia, as the friendly suit is
apparently seldom, if ever, invoked in our courts.
There remains for consideration the second suggested
method of compromising A's claim against D-that of
entering into a settlement with A's legal guardian. In all
states, statutes will be found providing for the appointment
of legal guardians and defining their powers. It is gen-
erally held by the courts that, in the absence of statutory
restrictions, a legal guardian who has been duly appointed
and qualified has the power to compromise his ward's
claims for personal injuries, provided such settlement is
made in good faith and is not grossly unfair.6
The West Virginia statutes on the subject of the relations
between guardian and ward appear in Chapter 82 of the
Code. Section 7 of this chapter defines the powers and
authority of a legal guardian in this state as follows:-
"Every guardian who shall be appointed as aforesaid,
and give bond when required, shall have the custody of
his ward, and the possession, care and management of
his estate, real and personal * * * ."
No decision of our Appellate Court has been found which
expressly passes upon the right of a legal guardian in West
Virginia to compromise and release his ward's cause of
action for personal injuries. However, it is believed that
the language of the statute quoted above is sufficiently
broad to give the guardian such power. There can be no
doubt, and our Supreme Court of Appeals has held,7 that
any money paid in compromise of an infant's claim should
be paid to its legal guardian; and it would seem to follow
that if the guardian receives the money, he is the natural
person to release the claim in settlement for which the
money is paid.
6 28 C. T. 1124; 12 R. C. L. 1130; Grievance Committee -v. Ennis, 84 Conn. 594, 80
At. 767 (1911) ; Manion v. Ohio Valley Railroad Co., 99 Ky. 504, 36 S. W. 530 (1896)
Bishop t. Big Sandy Lumber Co., 119 Ala. 463, 74 So. 931 (1917).Fletcher v. Parker, 53 W. Va. 422, 44 S. E. 422 (1903).
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If for no other reason, it would seem that the legal
guardian of a minor should have such power because it is
not vested elsewhere. The parents of the child cannot
release its claim; the child itself is incapable of executing
a valid release; the child's next friend, in whose name its
action at'law upon the claim must be brought, has no such
authority;" and as has been pointed out, a friendly suit is
both cumbersome and uncertain. There is no injustice to
the child in vesting such power in its guardian, for, if the
settlement is fraudulent or grossly unfair, the release
signed by the guardian will not support a plea of accord
and satisfaction in a suit instituted by the child upon its
claim after becoming of age.9 Under most statutes, in-
cluding those in effect in West Virginia, the father of the
child is usually entitled to be appointed its legal guardian.
The query may be made, therefore, why the father's
release after such appointment has any more validity as to
the child's cause of action than before. The answer is
obvious. Upon being appointed guardian, the father
takes a solemn oath to perform his duties properly as such,
ana furnishes bond conditioned upon the proper handling
of his ward's property. The transition from parent to
legal guardian may seem unimportant to the lay-mind, but
it has a fundamental legal significance.
It is submitted, therefore, that in the case supposed, D
should effect his settlement with A's legal guardian. If no
guardian has been appointed, D can arrange, with little
trouble and expense, to have B appointed as A's guardian
by the proper county court, and can then secure from B as
guardian a release which will give him the protection he
desires.
In conclusion, one other interesting feature might be
aaded to the supposed case discussed herein. If A dies as
a result of his injuries after D has made settlement with his
legal guardian, can D be sued by A's administrator under
Lord Campbell's Act, giving the personal representative a
right to sue on account of his decedent's death by wrongful
act? The difficulty in answering this question lies in the
fact that our state statutes following the English "Lord
Campbell's Act" are usually regarded as creating entirely
a Supra, n. 6.
' Norvell v. Kanawha & Michigan Railroad Co., 67 W. Va. 467. 6B S. E. 288 (1910).
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new and independent causes of action, and do not merely
permit a survival of the right of action which the deceased
person had. Such is the construction placed upon the
statutes in force in the Virginias.10 In view of the nature
of the cause of action vested in the administrator of the
decedent under these statutes, some courts have reached
the conclusion that the administrator's right to sue is not
barred by a release signed by the decedent before his
death. This doctrine is well illustrated by a decision of
the Supreme Court of South Dakota."" However, the
weight of authority, both in America and in England,
seems to be that a release of the injured party's claim dur-
ing his lifetime will prevent a suit being instituted by his
personal representative after death.12 This rule seems to
be the preferable one from the standpoint of fairness and
justice, although it is not free from theoretical difficulties.
In Virginia, the question has been solved by a statute
13
which provides that where the injured party has executed
a proper release during his lifetime, no suit can be main-
tained thereafter by his personal representative, even
though the injury results in death.
It would seem to be to the interest of society that full
effect should be given to the release executed by or on
behalf of the decedent prior to his death. Otherwise, the
party accused of liability for the accident would never dare
to enter into a settlement or compromise unless and until
he was certain that the injured party would not die from
the effects of his injuries.
JAMES M. GUIHER,
Clarksburg, West Virginia.
10 Lambert v. Ensign Co., 42 W. Va. 818, 26 S. E. 481 (1896) ; Beaver v. Putnam,
110 Va. 718, 67 S. E. 853(1910).
21 Rowe v. Richards. 35 S. D. 201, 151 N. W. 1001, L. R. A. 1915E, 1075 (1915).
12 17 C. J. 1246; 27 L. R. A. (N. S.) 176, note; L. R. A. 1915E, 1163, note; Read
v. Great Eastern Railway Co., L. R. 8 Q. B. 555, 9 Beat. & S. 714 (1868); Hecht i.
Ohio Railway Co., 132 Ind. 507, 32 N. E. 302 (1892) ; State v. United Railways Co., 121
Md. 457. 88 AtM 229 (1918).
"Virginia Code of 1924, 16787.
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